Battle of Mindanao
|Battle of Mindanao|
|Part of World War II, Pacific theater|
| File:Mindano plan.jpg|
Reconquest of Mindanao Map
United States and Philippines
| Franklin C. Sibert
Albert G. Noble
Roscoe B. Woodruff
Clarence A. Martin
Wendell W. Fertig
| Gyosaku Morozumi|
| 35,000 U.S. troops
24,000 Filipino guerrillas
|43,000 Japanese troops|
|Casualties and losses|
| 820 killed
| 10,000 killed|
additional 8,000 deaths due to starvation and disease
|Philippines campaign (1944–45)|
|Leyte – Leyte Gulf – Ormoc Bay – Mindoro – Lingayen Gulf – Luzon – Cabanatuan – Bataan – Manila – Corregidor – Los Baños – Palawan – Visayas – Mindanao|
The Battle of Mindanao fought by U.S. Forces and allied Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese from 10 March to 15 August 1945 at Mindanao island in the Philippine Archipelago, in a series of actions officially designated as Operation VICTOR V, and part of the campaign for the liberation of the Philippines during World War II, which was waged to complete the recapture of the southernmost portions of the archipelago and secure them from remaining enemy forces.
Highly Inhospitable Terrain
The campaign for Mindanao posed the greatest challenge for the liberating American forces, primarily for three reasons: the island's inhospitable geography aside from the extended enemy defenses and the strength and condition of the Japanese forces, which contained the significantly remaining concentration of combat troops in the Philippines.
Like most of the Philippine Islands and other similar places the U.S. Army operated elsewhere in the Pacific, the geographical conditions of Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, offered very little inspiration for soldiers who would have to fight there. It boasted a long and irregular coastline, the inland topography generally characterized as rugged and mountainous. Rain forests and numerous crocodile-infested rivers covered the terrain, the rest by either lake, swamp or grassland. These grassland regions, along with dense groves of abacá trees, source of hemp fiber, offer the worst obstacles which limit vision and sapping the strength of soldiers who would have to force their way through.
The few roads in Mindanao further complicated the problem of movement. Two of these, was the generously named Highway 1, which cuts across the southern portion of the island, from just south of Parang on Illana Bay in the west to Digos on the Davao Gulf in the east and then north to Davao. The other, Sayre Highway the main north-south road, starts at Kabacan, midway between Illana Bay and Davao Gulf, then runs north through the mountains of Bukidnon and Macajalar Bay (off Misamis Oriental Province) on the northern coast.
The strongest of the Japanese defenses were concentrated around the Davao Gulf area, which was heavily mined to counter an amphibious landing, and on Davao City itself, the island's largest and most important city. Artillery and anti-aircraft batteries extensively ringed the coastal shoreline defenses. Believing that the Americans would ultimately attack from Davao Gulf and also anticipating that they would be eventually driven from the city, the Japanese also prepared defensive bunkers inland behind its perimeter where they could retire and regroup, with the intention of prolonging the campaign as much as possible.
Operation VICTOR V
On 10 March 1945, the U.S. Eighth Army under Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger was formally ordered by Gen. Douglas MacArthur to clear the rest of Mindanao, with the start of Operation VICTOR V, with expectations that the campaign would take four months. Eichelberger had misgivings about the projected timetable for the operation, but nonetheless, his Eighth Army staffers came up with a more effective plan.
Instead of the expected headlong frontal assault on the enemy defenses, the plan called for securing a beachhead at Illana Bay in the undefended west, then a drive eastward more than a hundred miles through jungle and mountains to strike the enemy from the rear. The objective which called for achieving surprise and pressing forward quickly and aggressively by the invading forces, deemed Eichelberger, could unhinge the Japanese both physically and psychologically. Key to the operation's success involved the beachhead performance of the landing force and the ability of the participating units to maintain the momentum of their attack, preempting Japanese reactions, and hopefully before the rainy season starts which complicate movement in the island.
Ground operations were assigned to X Corps under Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, with Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff's 24th Infantry Division (United States)|24th Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. Clarence A. Martin's 31st Infantry Division as principal combat units. Amphibious Task Group 78.2, now under Rear Adm. Albert G. Noble was tasked to carry the 24th Division and X Corps headquarters to the assault beaches near Malabang by 17 April to secure a forward airfield. Five days later, the 31st Division was expected to be in Parang, twenty miles south, located near Highway 1, the route to Davao.
Capture of Zamboanga and Sulu
On the same day Eichelberger's forces were ordered to invade Mindanao, remnants of Maj. Gen. Jens A. Doe's 41st Infantry Division carried out Operation VICTOR IV, the seizure of Zamboanga, the large peninsula of Mindanao that extended to the southwest, which was concurrent with the recapture of Palawan, dubbed Operation VICTOR III. A sizable enemy force, numbering about 9,000 men of the 54th Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB), had established strong defensive positions around Zamboanga City at the southern tip of the peninsula.
The slow construction of the airfield at Palawan posed a problem for tactical air support augmenting the Zamboanga operation. The seizure of a makeshift airstrip at Dipolog, about 145 miles to the northeast of Zamboanga City, the Americans rapidly exploited the opportunity, airlifting two reinforced companies from the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division to ensure control of the airstrip. Soon thereafter, Marine Aircraft Group, Zamboanga under Col. Clayton C. Jerome was flying sorties off the airstrip to cover naval bombardment and landing preparations off Zamboanga City.
After bombings of the landing areas by the 13th Air Force and a three-day bombardment by the U.S. Navy, the 162nd and 163rd Infantry Regiments landed three miles west of Zamboanga City. Japanese opposition to the landings were minimal and the 41st Division troops quickly captured the city, which was decimated by the pre-invasion bombardments. Next day, 11 March, the Americans encountered strong resistance when they attacked enemy positions in the hills, overlooking the coastal plain. For two weeks, U.S. infantry, ably supported by Marine aviation and naval gunfire, fought the Japanese along a five-mile front, in terrain so rugged that tanks could not be used, and in positions heavily fortified with deep earthen emplacements, barbed wire, minefields, and booby traps.
On 23 March, after heavy fighting, the center of the Japanese line finally broke and in the next three days, the 162nd Infantry continued eliminating resistance in the central sector. The 186th Infantry, replacing the 163rd, continued the attack and the 54th Japanese IMB was forced to pull out a week later, harried by guerrilla units, retreating through the peninsula and into the jungle. After some time, mopping up operations, resulting in 220 Americans killed compared with 6,400 Japanese dead.
Alongside the Zamboanga operation, smaller units of the 41st Division invaded the Sulu Archipelago, a long stretch of islands reaching from the Zamboanga Peninsula to North Borneo. Rapidly taken in succession were Basilan, Malamaui, Tawi-Tawi, Sanga Sanga and Bangao. On 9 April, strong enemy resistance at Jolo was encountered. Anchoring their stubborn defense around Mount Dabo, some 3,900 Japanese troops held off the 163rd Infantry supported by Filipino guerrillas. By 22 April, the allies took the position after hard fighting and the rest of the enemy troops fled and held out in the west for another two months. The 163rd suffered 40 dead and 125 wounded by mid-June, 1945, while some 2,000 Japanese perished.
Siege of Malabang
As Rear Admiral Noble's Task Force 78.2 moved toward Illana Bay to prepare the landings at Parang, Col. Vertig, commander of guerrilla forces in Mindanao sent word that his guerrillas owned Malabang and its airstrip. But a battalion-size force of Japanese were trapped within Malabang and Col. Wendell Fertig's men were having difficulty evicting them. Starting 3 April, Col. Jerome's Marine aviators from Dipolog moved to the Malabang airstrip, and with target information from the guerrillas, proceeded to bomb the Japanese positions. By 14 April, the remaining enemy forces fled and pushed their way through the guerrilla lines, ending the stalemate.
With friendly forces in complete control of Malabang, Sibert, Woodruff and Noble, realized an opportunity to speed up the initial penetration of Central Mindanao and quickly changed their plans to take advantage of the new developments. The 24th Division would come ashore at Parang, much closer to Highway 1, thus speeding up the operation.
Push to Central Mindanao
While the Parang landings proceeded on 17 April without a hitch and the 24th Division quickly heading inland, the Eighth Army planners assumed correctly that the Japanese might destroy the bridges along Highway 1, and decide to use the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 3rd Engineer Special Brigade to exploit the Mindanao River. This waterway traversed roughly parallel to Highway 1 and for thirty-five miles navigable some ten miles west of Kabacan town and Sayre Highway.
On 21 April, a small fleet of gunboats led by Lt. Col. Robert Amory sailed upriver and seized Kabacan and the junction of Highway 1 and Sayre Highway the next day. This startled the nearby Japanese garrisons, and they fled north and west. In turn, the Mindanao River became the main line of supply as troops and rations were disgorged far upriver.
Next day, 22 April, the 31st Division waded ashore, with Marine Air Group 24 arriving at Malabang to provide air support for Mindanao ground operations. With both divisions ashore and ahead of schedule, Gen. Sibert ordered the 24th to continue its advance up Highway 1 to Digos, then seize Davao City. The 31st would follow to Kabacan and then attack north up Sayre Highway toward Macajalar Bay.
Tactically, the Japanese blundered in allowing the Americans to seize the key road junction of Kabacan so easily; the 30th and 100th Japanese Divisions would be hopelessly separated with the American advance while allowing X Corps to build up momentum and ultimately lead to their destruction. That Japanese error was the direct result of the surprise achieved by Eichelberger's decision to land at Illana Bay.
With Gen. Woodruff's 24th Division moving so rapidly, the Americans were almost on top of the Japanese around Davao before Gen. Morozumi learned too late that the western landing was in fact, not diversionary. Upon reaching Digos on 27 April, the Americans quickly overwhelmed the defending Japanese who were prepared only to repel an assault - from the sea, not from their rear. The 24th Division immediately turned north and headed toward Davao City.
Fighting in Davao City
On 3 May 1945, the first combat elements of the 24th Division entered Davao City against less opposition than had been expected. The enemy had contented themselves with destroying the city as best they could before withdrawing inland. While it took just fifteen days, despite severe heat and humidity and constant rain, with an entire division travelling 115 miles and seized the last major Philippine city under Japanese control, with a perfectly executed battle plan, the real battle for Mindanao had begun. Up to a point, X Corps had deliberately bypassed the main Japanese defenses and now turned to eliminate them.
A chronicler for the 24th Division wrote: "The soldiers of the 24th Infantry, considered the post-Davao operations to be the hardest, bitterest and, most exhausting battle of the ten island campaigns. In addition to the tenacious defense put up by the Japanese, another punishing aspect of the subsequent combat was the proliferous fields of abaca. To the foot soldiers fighting in the Davao province, the word abaca was synonymous with hell...Countless acres around Davao are covered with these thick-stemmed plants, fifteen to twenty feet high; the plants grow as closely together as sugar cane, and their long, lush, green leaves are interwoven in a welter of green so dense that a strong man must fight with the whole weight of his body for each foot of progress...In the abaca fields, visibility was rarely more than ten feet. No breeze ever reached through the gloomy expanse of green, and more men - American and Japanese - fell prostrate from the overpowering heat than bullets. The common way for scouts to locate an enemy position in abaca fighting was to advance until they received machinegun fire at a range of three to five yards. For the next two months, in such an environment, the 24th Division fought the Japanese. While the infantry sought out the Japanese defenses, platoons and squads worked through the abaca and surrounding jungle to seek out enemy bunkers and spider holes."
In this way, fighting progressed slowly but the Americans were making headway. At Libby Airdrome and the village of Mintal, some five miles west of Davao City, the 21st Infantry Regiment got assailed from three sides by a numerically stronger enemy. Individual acts of heroism often spelled the difference between victory and defeat in the desperate fighting. On 14 May, posthumous Medal of Honor awardee, Pfc. James Diamond of D Company fell mortally wounded as he was leading a patrol to evacuate more casualties when came under heavy attack. He drew enemy fire while sprinting to an abandoned machinegun, and got caught in a hail of bullets, but he allowed his patrol to reach safety.
By 17 May, exhausted and bloodied, the 24th Division renewed its offensive, and this time, the 19th Infantry Regiment, supported by Fertig's guerrillas blew open the Japanese eastern flanks and captured the Villages of Tacunan, Ula, Matina Biao, Magtuod and Mandug on May 29. The Japanese 100th Division collapsed and retreated. But soon the fighting erupted into pursuit and mopping up operations against bypassed enemy pockets, which later claimed the life of the 19th Infantry's commander, Col. Thomas "Jock" Clifford.
The fighting around the fringes of Davao City cost the 24th Infantry Division some 350 dead and 1,615 wounded, while the Japanese 100th Division suffered about 4,500 casualties.
Battle of Colgan Woods
Meanwhile, the 31st Division had forged on Kibawe town on Highway 1, some forty miles distant, since 27 April 1945, with the 124th Infantry Regiment of Col. Edward M. Starr at point, where the first monsoon rains started creating havoc on the advance. Running into an enemy battalion hurrying south, Lt. Col. Robert M. Fowler's 2nd Battalion with Battery B, 149th Field Artillery attached, engaged the Japanese with much needed artillery fire, killing at least fifty, and sending the rest fleeing.
On 3 May, the 31st Division reached Kibawe, but not without worsening enemy resistance. The town led to a supposed Japanese supply trail that twisted and turned south, until it reached the ocean shore town of Talomo. The treacherous terrain proved equally dangerous to both sides as they struggled in the ensuing battle for Talomo trail on 11 May. About 1,000 Japanese held the trail, but jungle rain forest, torrential rains and abysmal trail conditions were the real factors. Airdropped supplies to the isolated infantrymen were common as the trail was impassable to motor vehicles. By 30 June, the 167th Infantry managed to move only five miles beyond the Pulangi river, even with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas. It lost 80 men and 180 wounded to the Japanese, whom they inflicted about 400 dead.
On 6 May, the 124th Infantry Regiment continued to move up Sayre Highway without the Talomo trail reconnaissance operation in full swing, and in doing so, it moved into its toughest fight of the Mindanao campaign, if not of the Pacific War itself. A Japanese battalion, ordered by Morozumi to delay the 124th at Maramag some thirty miles south to ensure the regrouping of his 30th Division, did with such ferocity, that it took six days for the 124th to reach Maramag. The battle area from Talomo to Maramag was later renamed Colgan Woods by the troops in remembrance of Capt. Thomas A. Colgan, an Army chaplain who was killed during one of his repeated efforts to aid wounded soldiers in the line of fire. The battle was one of the many brutal struggles in the Pacific theater that never made any headlines.
Firing from dugout positions, from camouflaged spider holes with connecting tunnels, and from virtually invisible pillboxes, the defending Japanese chose to die in place rather than retreat. Banzai charges struck the 124th, fighting without supporting artillery, first on 7 May and then on the night of 14 to 15 May. The latter ended in a rout as American automatic weapons stopped the attackers, killing 73 Japanese, marking the end of the battle. In the fighting for Colgan Woods and Maramag, the 124th Infantry lost 69 men and 177 wounded.
The final stages of the battle for Mindanao culminated with the 155th Infantry Regiment of Col. Walter J. Hanna occupying Malaybalay on 21 May, and taking control of the Sayre Highway, together with the 108th Infantry Regiment of Col. Maurice D. Stratta after a steep fight with the Japanese. Gen. Morozumi and the remnants of his 30th Division continued their retreat up the Agusan Valley after a vicious encounter with the pursuing 31st Division on 5 June, where they eventually made it to the jungles. Farther south on Mindanao, smaller X Corps units seized Sarangani and Balut islands, situated off its southern tip, and on 12 July ,the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry arrived at the southeast side of Sarangani Bay to reinforce a reconnaissance patrol, which located a strong Japanese force in the interior, and proceeded to pursue the enemy through the jungle. Operations in these areas continued until mid-August, when news arrived of the Japanese surrender.
Outcome and Historical Significance
While mopping up operations by small American units and Filipino guerrillas continued for some time, Gen. Eichelberger announced the end of organized Japanese resistance. Throughout Mindanao, pockets of Japanese troops, safeguarded by the impenetrable terrain of the island's unexplored jungle expanses, survived until the end of the war, when some 22,000 emerged to surrender. That well signalled the total liberation of the Philippines. Some 10,000 Japanese troops were killed, some 7,000 were wounded and another 8,000 succumbed to starvation and disease. The Americans lost only 820 men and 2,880 wounded for the entire campaign.
The seemingly low cost in battlefield casualties for the Americans in the Mindanao campaign stemmed, aside from the overall brilliance and skill of the Eighth Army planners and leaders, was from increasing assistance for Filipino guerrillas, which in military terms, constituted a valuable "force multiplier" for the Eighth Army units. Before landings, guerrillas harassed Japanese units, provided valuable intelligence about Japanese dispositions and the relative suitability of landing beaches. And after each landing, the Filipinos fought alongside the Americans and pursued the Japanese throughout the island interiors.
- Military History of the Philippines during World War II
- Military history of the United States
- Military history of Japan
- History of the Philippines
- History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 13: The Liberation of the Philippines--Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944-1945 by Samuel Eliot Morison (2002) University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0-252-07064-X
- World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia (Military History of the United States) by S. Sandler (2000) Routledge, ISBN 0-8153-1883-9
- Ibiblio.Org: U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, Southern Philippines
- U.S. Army Center of Military History, World War II Medal of Honor Recipients A-F
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